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NOTES

LOUISIANA PRODUCTS LIABILITY:

THE ALLERGIC CONSUMER

Plaintiff suffered an acute allergic reaction to the defendant's hair relaxant, "Curl Free," causing her scalp, forehead,
and neck to erupt in blisters and her hair to fall out in tufts.
Her claim for relief, based on the combined theories of manufacturer's strict products liability and negligent failure to warn
of the dangerous propensities of the product, was denied by
the trial court. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the
Third Circuit, though finding that the plaintiff's condition was
at least in part due to an allergic reaction to the defendant's
product, affirmed the lower court's decision on the grounds that
no vice or defect could be found in the product and that the
possibility of danger from an allergic reaction to "Curl Free"
was so remote that defendant was under no duty to warn of such
a possibility. The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari. Thomas v. The Gillette Co., 230 So.2d 870 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970); cert. denied 255 La. 810, 233 So.2d 249 (1970).
All kinds of food, drug, and cosmetic products intended for
human use can and do produce unintended side effects. Regardless of how beneficial and desirable these products may be, there
will be some persons who will be allergic to an ingredient or
ingredients therein.' Such products may be completely harmless
to those who are not allergically susceptible to injury from their
use, and yet, these same products may have deleterious effects
on others who are unknowingly allergic.
Louisiana courts have had but a single occasion prior to
the Thomas case to adjudicate the complaints of one suffering
an allergy related injury resulting from use of a consumer
product. In Moran v. Insurance Co. of North America2 recovery
was denied by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal to a consumer
who had suffered severe skin injuries over her body as the
result of an application of defendant's sun tan lotion. Suit was
brought under the theory of manufacturer's strict products liability. The court held that her injuries were non-compensable
since they were the result of an allergic condition or a psychological idiosyncrasy. They concluded that it would be both
"illegal and inequitable" to impose liability for such an unforeseeable occurrence.8 The court cited as persuasive authority the
1. Keeton, Product L4abtiity-Problems Perta4ning to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 27 (1965).
2. 146 So.2d 4 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
3. Id. at 7.
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opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Bish v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.4 and the Utah
Supreme Court in Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co.,5 and quoted with
approval the language of 26 A.L.R.2d at page 966. Denying plaintiff recovery in Bish, the Fifth Circuit stated that a manufacturer
of a product innocuous to normal (non-allergic) persons need
give no warning of the possibility of allergy produced injuries to
those so susceptible.6 In Bennett, the Utah Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in affirming a lower court's opinion
that appellant's allergy produced injuries were non-compensable
as a matter of law because they were the unforeseeable result
of using the product. 7 The excerpt from 26 A.L.R.2d 966, quoted
in the Moran opinion, states that as a general rule there is no
manufacturer's warranty liability where the buyer was allergic
or unusually susceptible to injury from the product.
In Thomas, plaintiff asserted her claim for recovery on the
theories8 of manufacturer's strict products liability without fault
and the negligent failure to warn of the inherent danger in
the product.9 The court rejected the plaintiff's strict products
liability argument by its own interpretation of existing Louisiana jurisprudence. Citing Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Corp.,1o Arnold
v. United States Rubber Co.," and Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer,
4. 236 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1956).
5. 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951).
6. 236 F.2d 62, 69 (5th Cir. 1956), cited at 230 So.2d 870, 875 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1970). The Bish court cited the Australian case of Levi v. ColgatePalmolive Proprietary, Ltd., 41 New So. W. St. 48, 58 New So. W.W.N. 63
(1941) as persuasive authority.
7. 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525, 528 (1951), cited at 230 So.2d 870, 875 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1970).
8. More than one theory of recovery may be urged in the same cause of
action under products liability: e.g., McCauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions
Co., 202 So.2d 492 (La. App 1st Cir. 1967), 252 La. 528, 211 So.2d 637 (1968),
in which recovery was sought under negligence and implied warranty. See
also Arnold v. United States Rubber Co., 203 So.2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1967), in which recovery was sought under warranty and manufacturer's
negligent failure to warn.
9. Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, Ltd., 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911) and
LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952)
are the leading cases in Louisiana products liability. Other major cases
include Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963);
McCauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions Co., 202 So.2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967), 252 La. 528, 211 So.2d 637 (1968); Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Corp., 199 So.2d
210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage Co., 193 So.2d
807 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Gilbert v. John Gendusa Bakery, Inc., 144 So.2d
760 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Lescher v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 129
So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d dir. 1961); McAvin v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 85 So.2d
63 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1956).
10. 199 So.2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
11. 203 So.2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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Ltd.,12 the court held that there must be some finding of fault
on the part of the manufacturer which may be implied by a
showing of the defectiveness of the product. 8 Here, the court
could find "no vices or defects in the hair relaxer which the
plaintiff used"' 4 even though it was convinced that the plaintiff's
injuries were due to allergic reaction to defendant's product
alone or in combination with the use of another product.' 5 The
court also rejected the plaintiff's argument of negligent failure
to warn holding that "the possibility of danger from an allergic reaction.., was so remote and unlikely that defendant was under
no duty to warn purchasers or users of such a possibility."' 6
The court relied heavily on the previous opinion of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal in Moran as authority for its denial of
plaintiff's right to recovery under this theory. The Thomas court,
therefore, perpetuated the language of the Bish, and Bennett
opinions and A.L.R.2d as cited in Moran. 7
Judge Tate, in his dissenting opinion, urged that plaintiff
be granted relief under the doctrine of strict manufacturer's
products liability, 8 maintaining that a consumer suffering allergy
related injuries should not be barred from recovery merely
because he is not "normal."' 9 He argued that a manufacturer
could not limit the reasonable fitness of his product to a predetermined group of normal buyers. 20 Judge Tate proposed that
relief be granted under the doctrine of strict manufacturer's
products liability "in light of the seriousness of the harm that
could have been foreseen to the allergic user, and considering
the usefulness to society of the defendant's product."12' He stated
that the majority's interpretation of existing Louisiana products
liability jurisprudence would so limit the prerequisite finding
12. 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911).
13. 230 So.2d 870, 873-74 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
14. Id. at 874.
15. Id. at 873.
16. Id. at 875.
17. Cited in Moran at 146 So.2d 4, 6-7 (La App. 4th Cir. 1962), and in
Thomas at 230 So.2d 870, 874-75 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970). See notes 7-9 supra,
and accompanying text.
18. 230 So.2d 870, 879 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
19. Id. Judge Tate was referring to the specific language cited from
Bish in the instant case at 875, 4.e.: "Nor is a warning required as to a
product where the injury results from the sensitivity or allergy of a person
in the use of a product which would be innocuous to normal people."
20. Id. at 878, citing Howard v. Avon Prod., Inc., 155 Colo. 444, 395 P.2d
1007 (1964), and Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460,
162 A.2d 513 (1960).
21. Thomas v. Gillette Co., 230 So.2d 870, 879 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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of fault as to include only willful harm and personal negligence.2 2
This interpretation would exclude those susceptible to allergic
injuries from the protection afforded under the law.2 Judge
Tate maintained that, through a proper interpretation of the
law of Louisiana in this area, it is evident that under certain
circumstances (as in the instant case) fault must be presumed
24
notwithstanding the apparent clean hands of the defendant.
The Moran and Thomas courts reached similar holdings
(non-foreseeability) in denying recovery for allergy related injuries. However, the ratio decidendi for each holding remains
unclear from a reading of the courts' respective opinions.2 5 These
somewhat ambiguous opinions could lead to two inferences as
to what rationale the courts used in denying recovery. It is
submitted that these courts may have been unwilling to recognize allergic injuries as foreseeable harmful consequences of
using consumer products. 26 This inference may be drawn from
the Thomas court's continuation of Moran's use of specific lan2
guage of the Bish2 and Bennett 8 cases and 26 A.L.R.2d 966.29
Under this reading of Thomas, it is doubtful that the allergic
consumer would recover in Louisiana. However, it may be equally
inferred that the two courts reached their holdings through a
comparison of the number of complaints of similar allergic reaction to defendants' products with the total units produced. 8°
22. Id. See notes 13-18 supra, and accompanying text.
23. In actions seeking relief for allergy related injuries, it seems unfair
to hinge liability solely upon a finding of a fault or a defect in the defendant's product. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to show a fault
or defect in a product which is harmless to the non-allergic user, but dangerous to one unknowingly allergic to it.
24. Citing Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 30-31 (5th
Cir. 1963), which quotes Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Concept of
Fault, 27 TUL. L. REV. 1, 14, 19 (1952).
25. Neither the Thomas nor the Moran court explicitly state the exact
criteria on which they based their holdings of non-foreseeability.
26. It is questionable if the cited language of Bish and Bennett retain
their persuasiveness in light of the holdings to the contrary in those common
law jurisdictions where the claims of the allergic consumer have been
adjudicated. The persuasive value of A.L.R. is questionable.
27. 230 So.2d 870, 875 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970: "Nor Is a warning required
as to a product where an injury results from the sensitivity or allergy of a
person in the use of a product which would be innocuous to normal people."
28. Id.: "[A]ppellant's ailment, being the result of an allergy, was not
compensable as a latter of law. . . . Every substance . . . occasionally becomes anathema to him particularly allergic to it. To require insurability
against such an unforeseeable happenstance would weaken the structure of
common sense, as well as present an unreasonable burden on channels of
trade."
29. Id. at 874-75: "[T]here is no liability upon the seller, where the buyer
or user was allergic of unusually susceptible to injury from the product."
30. In Moran, 146 So.2d 4, 8 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (one out of 433,047).
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Both courts, deeming the likelihood of such an occurrence improbable, held that under the facts of the respective cases, the
possibility of allergic injury was unforeseeable. 31 This reading
of the cases would allow the allergic consumer to obtain relief
if he were able to convince the trier of fact that injuries such
as his occur with such regularity that they are foreseeable, hence
compensable. These opinions do not lend clarity to the Louisiana
position on recovery for allergic injuries. It is submitted that
the vagueness of these decisions will be of little assistance to
Louisiana courts faced with similar claims for recovery.
The second inference discussed above is not inconsistent
with the method of dealing with the claims of allergic consumers
developed by a number of Anglo-American courts.8 2 There, recovery has been allowed only when plaintiff has shown that
the danger of allergic injury was so widespread, serious, and
predictable that the defendant manufacturer was placed under
a duty to warn potential users of his product of such a possibility of harm, which he failed to do.28 These courts have generally required the injured plaintiff to produce evidence which
would support a reasonable finding that: "(a) the product involved contains a harmful ingredient; (b) such ingredient is
In Thomas, 230 So.2d 870, 873 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970) (two out of over a
million).
31. See notes 4 and 19 supra, and accompanying text.
32. The leading decisions in those common law jurisdictions which have
been called to adjudicate the issue of recovery for allergic injuries have
been: Wright v. Carter Prod. Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Howard v.
Avon Prod., Inc., 155 Colo. 444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964); Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960); Esbrog v. Bailey Drug
Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan, 444
S.W.2d 770 (Texas App. Beaumont 1969); Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Texas App. Dallas 1965).
33. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 290 (1969), referring to Wright v. Carter Prod. Co., 244
F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957). See also Noel, Duty To Warn Allergic Users of
Products,12 VANe. L. REV. 331 (1959).

Prosser states the general law in this area at W. PROsseR, LAW 0 TORTS
669 (3d ed. 1964): "The situation may be quite different where there is an
allergy, more serious in character, to some chemical of which the ordinary
man in the street has never heard. The question becomes the familiar one of
balancing the probability and gravity of the harm against the value of the
product and the defendant's convenience. Where the allergy Is an infrequent
one, found in only an insignificant percentage of the population, the tendency
has been to hold that the seller need not even give warning. But if it is
one common to any substantial, even though relatively small, number of
possible users, the tendency has been to require a warning, and without it
to find negligence or a breach of warranty. It would, however, be an oversimplification to attempt to draw an arbitrary line, since other factors will
affect the recision, including the seriousness of the harm to be expected to
the allergic user, and the expert knowledge which the defendant has or
should have as the maker of such a product."
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harmful to a reasonably foreseeable and appreciable class or
number of potential users of the products; and (c) plaintiff has
been innocently injured in the use of the product in the manner
and for the purpose intended. 8' 4 The courts have further held
that it is not only incumbent on the injured plaintiff to establish
that the product involved was capable of producing such allergic
injuries ((a) above), but also that the defendant-manufacturer
knew" or had constructive knowledge 6 of his products' dangerous propensity. The highest expert knowledge of all that is
scientifically discoverable about the product, especially its allergy
producing potentiality,8 7 has been imputed to food, drug, and
cosmetic manufacturers because of their particular relationship
to the public.8 The burden has been placed upon the injured

consumer to prove that he is a member of an appreciable class
of similarly affected persons ((b)

above), whom the manu-

34. Esbrog v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 358, 378 P.2d 298, 304
(1963). For cases in accord see Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan, 444 S.W.2d
770 (Texas App. Beaumont 1969) and Keeton, Product Liability-Problems
Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 27 (1965), referring to
Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prod. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840,
846 (1964). See also Note, 46 CORx. L.Q. 465, 475-76 (1961), referring to Crotty
v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 467, 162 A.2d 513, 516
(1960) and Esbrog v. Bailey Drug Co., supra.
35. A manufacturer may become aware of latent defects in his product
through consumer complaints of injuries received. Continued failure to give
adequate warning after reasonable notification of the dangerous propensities of the product will render the manufacturer liable. "The result has been
to require the manufacturer to follow his product into the hands of the
consumer and to warn of dangers later discovered." Comment, 1967 WASH.
U.L.Q. 206, 208 referring to Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich.
163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959) and Moberly v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 4 Ohio App.
2d 126, 211 N.E.2d 839 (1965).
36. The main issue of concern has been the existence and the extent of
scientific knowledge dealing with the dangers associated with the use or
the misuse of a given product. At issue have been: (1) the extent of available scientific knowledge; (2) the manufacturer's actual knowledge of the
dangerous propensities of his product; and (3) the extent that the manufacturer is chargeable with such knowledge. See Keeton, Product LiabilityProblems Pertainingto Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
In the past most courts have held that the defendant manufacturer must
have actual knowledge of the dangerous nature of his product. "But more
recent cases hold the defendant to a duty to warn of a danger he should
know about as an expert, regardless of his actual knowledge." Noel,
Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw.
L.J. 256, 291 1969), referring to Sterling Drugs, Inc., V. Cornish, 370 F.2d
82 (8th Cir. 1966); Wright v. Carter Prod. Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957);
Howard v. Avon Prod., Inc., 155 Colo. 444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964); Braun v.
Roux Distributing Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958) and Kaempfe v. Lehn &
Fink Prod. Corp., 21 App. Div.2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1964).
37. See Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of Manufacturer's Negligence,
49 VA. L. Rzv. 675 (1963); Whitmore, Allergies and Other Reactions Due to
Drugs and Cosmetics, 19 Sw. L.J. 76 (1965); Note, 37 COLo. L. REav. 305, 307
(1965).
38. See 3 L. FRUMmN & M. FRIRMAN, PRODUCrs LIABnnTY §§ 27, 28 (1968).
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facturer could have foreseen as susceptible to allergic injuries
0 Most courts have required plaintiff
from the use of his product.8
to quantitatively establish 4o the existence of a "substantial" or
"appreciable" class 41 of persons similarly affected of which he

is a member; others have disregarded this strictly quantitative
approach in favor of finding merely "some" or "a few" others
similarly affected.42 It is also incumbent on the injured plaintiff
39. Ray v. J. C. Penney Co., 274 F.2d 519, 521 (10th Cir. 1959), quoted in
Note, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 465, 475 (1961): "The law requires a person to reasonably (sic) guard against probabilities, not possibilities, and one who sells a
product on the market, knowing that some unknown few, not in an identifiable class which could be effectively warned, may suffer an allergic reaction . . . , need not respond in damages." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
or TORTS § 395, comment k, at 331 (1965) and Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw.L.J. 256, 291, 297 (1969).
For further reference see Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d
640, 644 (Texas App. Dallas 1965): "We believe and we hold that in such
cases the manufacturer of a drug intended for human consumption or intimate bodily use should be held liable on the grounds of implied warranty
for injurious results only when such results or some similar results ought
reasonably to have been foreseen by a person of ordinary care in an appreciable number of persons in light of the attending circumstances."
See also Note, 21 Sw. L.J. 678 (1967); Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New
Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 467, 162 A.2d 513, 516 (1960); Esbrog v. Bailey
Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 358, 378 P.2d 304 (1963); Alberto-Culver Co. v.
Morgan, 444 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Texas App. Beaumont 1969).
40. The basic undertaking has been mathematically to compare the
number of similarly susceptible persons to the total number of consumers
of the given product. It is incumbent on the plaintiff to introduce scientifio
and clinical data in order to come forth with such information. The product
must be analyzed and its possibly harmful ingredients isolated and studied
In order to anticipate what percentage of the population may be affected.
A second method has been to compare the number of previously reported
incidents of allergic injury associated with the use of the particular product
with the total units produced. Discovery rules provide a method of obtaining such information. Once computed, the resulting ratios are offered into
evidence to support the plaintiff's contention of the existence of an "appreciable" class of similarly susceptible persons of which he is a member. See
Note, 37 COLO. L. Rs.v. 305, 306-07 (1965).
There seems to be no way to predict accurately what size these ratios
must be before the court will find the class affected to be "appreciable."
Id. See also Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or
Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 292 (1969).
41. The "identifiable class" or "appreciable number of similarly susceptible persons" concept has been dealt with by numerous courts with
minor semantic variation. For a more thorough discussion see Howard v.
Avon Prod., Inc., 144 Colo. 444, 452, 395 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1964).
42. In Wright v. Carter Prod. Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1957), the
court allowed recovery even though the plaintiff was unable to establish
the existence of an "appreciable" class of similarly affected persons. "We
believe that duties to warn are not, in all cases, measured by solely quantitative standards." Probably, the court was unable to justify the defendant's continued failure to give warning even after having received repeated complaints of allergic Injuries even though the number of persons so
affected was not significant. Accord: Hungerhold v. Land O'Lakes Creameries, 209 F. Supp. 177 (D. Minn. 1962).
In Esbrog v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 358, 378 P.2d 298, 304
(1963), the court stated: "What constitutes, in a given case, a reasonably
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to prove a causal connection between his allergic injuries and
his proper use of the defendant's products ((c) above). Such
proof is easily established and has been uniformly treated.
The application of this burden of proof has left little opportunity for courts to be vague or arbitrary in stating the reasons
for their decisions. The courts have denied recovery on the
grounds of foreseeability only where the injured consumer has
not established to their satisfaction the requisite burden of proof.
Unfortunately, Louisiana courts have failed to be as explicit
in expressing their position where this issue has been presented.
One susceptible to allergic injuries is not an abnormal person
to be deprived of protection under law. He should be entitled
to seek redress for the harms caused him. It is submitted that
the Louisiana products liability law on recovery for allergic
injuries could be best clarified through an express adoption of
this Anglo-American burden of proof discussed above. It is urged
that this approach be presented to a Louisiana court as a preferable method of adjudicating the claims of the allergic consumer.
David S. Willenzik
foreseeable and appreciable class or number of potential users, is incapable
of precise or quantitative definition."
Other courts have gone so far as to allow recovery where plaintiff has
shown just "some" or "only a small proportion" of the users of the product
were similarly affected without specifically defining this number as a given
percentage. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions and
Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 294-95 (1969), referring to Blanchi v. Denholm &
McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939); Reynolds v. Sunray Drug
Co., 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A.2d 666 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); Zirpola v. Adam Hat
Stores, 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
"If there is a substantial likelihood that even a small number will be
subjected to a substantial probability of injury, even in cases involving very
rare allergies, the injury is held to be foreseeable." Comment, 1967 WASH.
U.L.Q. 206, 219, referring to Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.
1963); Wright v. Carter Prod. Co., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Braun v. Roux
Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359,
136 A.2d 626 (1957); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Ct., 124 Cal.
App. 157, 268 P.2d 199 (1954). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TOTS 669 (3d
ed. 1964).

